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FOUNDATIONAL BUT NOT FUNDAMENTAL: 
NO RIGHT TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
ROBERT TORRES* 
The world is on fire, and despite a general consensus among 
scientists that climate change is an imminent threat, recent decades have 
been devoid of legislatures capable of enacting meaningful legislation. 
The flames rage on as our President, an outspoken denier of climate 
change, adds fuel to the fire by stripping whatever attempts had been 
previously made to mitigate the effects of climate change. Forced to live 
in what seems a forsaken world, nineteen youths, a nonprofit 
organization, and a scientist on behalf of all future generations brought 
suit against the United States government, seeking more robust 
environmental protections. In a landmark decision that garnered much 
thoughtful attention, Juliana v. United States, held, in pertinent part, that 
the U.S. Constitution protects a fundamental right to a climate system 
capable of sustaining human life. After nearly a century of looking past 
the written words of the Constitution to find intrinsic rights, twenty years 
ago the Supreme Court dictated a rigid two-part test for sustaining 
alleged fundamental rights. The Glucksberg test came to fruition despite 
decades of justices arguing for a more fluid analysis. That is until Justice 
Kennedy penned Obergefell v. Hodges. Justice Kennedy carefully 
sidestepped Glucksberg so as not to offend it and instead adopted that 
fluid approach in finding certain fundamental rights, leaving two 
possible paths.  This Note argues that under the current formation of 
Supreme Court substantive due process jurisprudence, the Constitution 
does not protect a fundamental right to a climate capable of sustaining 
human life. Neither Glucksberg nor Obergefell provide a proper avenue 
through which plaintiffs may successfully seek redress. Rather, plaintiffs 
must utilize other mechanisms to effectuate a lasting change, such as 
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amending the Constitution, employing the political process, or 
persistently litigating in a piecemeal fashion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What’s the point in trying? Why sprinkle the front door with water 
trickling from the garden hose when the entire house is ablaze? 
Certainly, though, the proper course would not be to turn the hose off 
and, instead, douse the house in kerosene, stand back, and revel in the 
warmth as everything turns to ash. No, the hose must stay wielded; the 
fate of future generations rests upon its continued effort, even if little 
progress is made. Relatively recent presidential action, coupled with 
decades of inaction by a seemingly indifferent legislature, has 
functioned as a catalyst in securing a future plagued by a volatile 
climate. Specifically, President Trump formally submitted an intent to 
withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement,1 rolled back automotive 
emissions standards,2 and dropped climate change from the list of 
national security threats.3 President Trump has not only actively sought 
to loosen regulations aimed at combating harmful emissions, he has 
 
 1.  Sarah Gibbens, 15 Ways the Trump Administration Has Changed Environmental 
Policies, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 1, 2019), 
 https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/02/15-ways-trump-administration-
impacted-environment/.  
 2.  See id. (saying that under President Obama, the fuel economy targets were aimed at an 
average of fifty-four miles-per-gallon by 2025 for all cars made after 2012, but President Trump 
has dialed that target back to just thirty-four miles-per-gallon by 2021). 
 3.  See id. (describing how removing climate change from the list of national security threats 
reduced the amount of funding for Department of Defense research and created rifts in societal 
perception of the impacts of natural weather phenomena). 
Torres Macros (Do Not Delete) 2/4/2021  2:03 AM 
Fall 2020] FOUNDATIONAL BUT NOT FUNDAMENTAL 177 
also consistently and publicly mocked the very existence of global 
warming and climate change.4 
Scientific evidence, however, unequivocally shows the climate 
system is warming, and human activity is an accelerant.5 Caused by the 
emission of greenhouse gases (GHG), the fallout from climate change 
will be catastrophic.6 By 2100, the projected rise in sea level resulting 
from melting ice caps will devastate coastal cities, drowning their 
infrastructure.7 The already extreme natural events will worsen and 
become more prevalent, increasing the number of displaced 
communities.8 Prolonged periods of drought will ensure wildfires have 
no shortage of fuel as they rage through communities, crops, and 
forests.9 An increase in global temperature will leave the environment 
uninhabitable for certain species, causing extinction and destruction of 
 
 4.  See Dylan Matthews, Donald Trump Has Tweeted Climate Change Skepticism 115 
Times. Here’s All of It., VOX (June 1, 2017, 9:29 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/6/1/15726472/trump-tweets-global-warming-paris-climate-agreement (collecting  
tweets from the president expressing skepticism for climate change science); see, e.g., Donald 
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 25, 2014, 6:48 PM), 
 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/427226424987385856 (“NBC News just called it the 
great freeze - coldest weather in years. Is our country still spending money on the GLOBAL 
WARMING HOAX?”); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 19, 2015, 8:43 
PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/656100109386674176 (“It’s really cold outside, 
they are calling it a major freeze, weeks ahead of normal. Man, we could use a big fat dose of 
global warming!”).  
 5.  See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 48 (2014), 
 https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf 
(stating that it is “extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average 
surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by anthropogenic increases in GHG 
concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together”).  
 6.  See THE NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, RECENT U.S. TEMPERATURE TRENDS 29 
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/our-changing-climate/recent-us-temperature-
trends#narrative-page-16566 (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) (saying that by 2100, a lower emissions 
model would see national temperatures rise three to five degrees Fahrenheit, or five to ten 
degrees Fahrenheit under an increasing emissions model).  
 7.  See Brady Dennis & Chris Moon, Scientists Nearly Double Sea Level Rise Projections 
for 2100, Because of Antarctica, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2016, 1:44 PM), 
 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/03/30/antarctic-loss-could-
double-expected-sea-level-rise-by-2100-scientists-say/ (“Places as far flung as South Florida, 
Bangladesh, Shanghai, Hampton Roads in Virginia and parts of Washington, D.C. could be 
engulfed by rising waters. . . .”). 
 8.  United States Geological Survey, What are the Long-Term Effects of Climate Change, 
https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-are-long-term-effects-climate-change-1?qt-
news_science_products=3#qt-news_science_products (last visited Nov. 29, 2020).  
 9.  Id. 
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ecosystems.10 To wit, the global community will even face an increase 
in the spread of infectious diseases.11 
In fact, the battle to gain a consensus in the scientific community 
that climate change poses a very imminent and real threat was long 
fought and seldom saw advancements.12 Since its inception more than 
120 years ago, the idea asserted by Svante Arrhenius that the presence 
or absence of GHGs in the atmosphere dictates whether the Earth will 
be warmer or cooler had been widely met with criticism.13 In 1896, 
obviously incapable of possessing the foresight necessary to fully 
appreciate the vast growth that would shortly ensue, Svante Arrhenius 
opined, based on GHG emissions at the time, that thousands of years 
would pass before the effects of global warming were realized.14 Over 
just a century later, it is clear that the constant, almost completely 
unabated, GHG emissions have left us without thousands of years to 
act.15 
Wary, the legislature is unwilling to (or incapable of) enacting 
meaningful environmental protection to remedy our forefathers’ 
oversight.16 Our Children’s Trust, a nonprofit with a mission to 
preserve the climate for present and future generations alike, filed suit 
 
 10.  How Climate Change Plunders the Planet, ENV’T. DEF. FUND, 
 https://www.edf.org/climate/how-climate-change-plunders-planet (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).  
 11.  Mary E. Wilson, Environmental Change and Infectious Diseases, ECOSYSTEM HEALTH, 
Mar. 2000, at 7–12.  
 12.  Stephan Harding, The Long Road to Enlightenment, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2007), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jan/08/climatechange.climatechangeenvironme
nt.  
 13.  See id. (arguing that Arrhenius’ findings that doubling carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
could raise global temperatures by five to six degrees Celsius were “virtually ignored by scientists 
obsessed with explaining the ice ages”). 
 14.  Svante Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature 
of the Ground, 41 PHIL. MAG. & J. SCI. 237 (1896).  
 15.  See IPCC, supra note 5, at 65 (indicating climate change will risk food and water security, 
especially in poorer populations, and increase the likelihood of severe illness and disruptions of 
livelihoods due to storm surge, sea level rise, and coastal flooding, among many other potential 
consequences during the 21st century). 
 16.  Credited with beginning the modern environmental movement, Rachel Carson in Silent 
Spring perhaps said it best: “If the Bill of Rights contains no guarantees that a citizen shall be 
secure against lethal poisons distributed either by private individuals or by public officials, it is 
surely only because our forefathers, despite their considerable wisdom and foresight, could 
conceive of no such problem.” Mia Hammersley, The Right to a Healthy and Stable Climate: 
Fundamental or Unfounded?, 7 ARIZ. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 117, 120 (2017) (quoting RACHEL 
CARSON, SILENT SPRING, 12 (1962)). 
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in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging, 
in pertinent part, a fundamental right to a healthy and stable climate.17 
This Note analyzes whether the plaintiffs’ claims in Juliana v. 
United States, under controlling substantive due process precedent, 
constitute a validly constructed fundamental right, providing 
protection from government infringement on the environment. Part 
One of this Note begins the analysis with an in-depth discussion of the 
holdings and procedural history of Juliana to provide an understanding 
of the gravitas of the complaint. Despite the many areas of controversy 
stemming from Juliana, this note only addresses the holding in which a 
fundamental right to a climate capable of sustaining human life is 
found. As such, Part Two, Subdivision A, necessarily combs through 
Supreme Court substantive due process jurisprudence leading up to 
Washington v. Glucksberg, illustrating how the Court’s iteration of 
what constitutes a fundamental right has evolved over time. Part Two, 
Subdivision B, then introduces the Glucksberg test for finding a 
fundamental right and the Court’s reasoning behind it. Part Two, 
Subdivision C, discusses the Court’s later departure from the test 
articulated in Glucksberg for a more fluid analysis under Obergefell. 
Part Three, Subdivisions A and B, argue that a fundamental right to a 
climate capable of sustaining human life is not deeply rooted in our 
nation’s history and was not carefully described when analyzed under 
Glucksberg. Part Three Subdivision C further argues that a 
fundamental right relating to the environment cannot be sustained 
under Obergefell’s reasoning. In conclusion, this Note suggests 
alternative and perhaps more suitable mechanisms for plaintiffs to use, 
such as those in Juliana, to successfully pursue the rights and remedies 
these plaintiffs seek. 
JULIANA V. UNITED STATES: THE CASE OF THE CENTURY 
In what has been heralded as “the case of the century,”18 twenty-
one plaintiffs, most members of a disenfranchised class, sought 
recompense in the judiciary for generations of harmful conduct 
 
 17. See First Am. Compl., ¶ 5, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Sept. 
10, 2015), ECF No. 7  (framing climate change as threatening fundamental rights to life, liberty, 
and property) [hereinafter “First Am. Compl.”].  
 18.  See, e.g., Chelsea Harvey, Trump Could Face the ‘Biggest Trial of the Century’ – Over 
Climate Change, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016, 3:20 PM), 
 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/12/01/trump-could-face-
the-biggest-trial-of-the-century-over-climate-change/ (quoting law professor Mary Wood).  
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sanctioned by the federal government in the hope that one branch 
would provide them the rights they know to be fundamental.19 
Originally, the plaintiffs brought suit against President Obama20 
and numerous federal executive agencies alleging that the federal 
government for more than 50 years “permitted, encouraged, and 
otherwise enabled continued exploitation, production, and combustion 
of fossil fuels . . . deliberately allow[ing] atmospheric [Carbon Dioxide 
(CO2)] concentrations to escalate to levels unprecedented in human 
history, resulting in a dangerous destabilizing climate system.”21 Such 
egregious conduct, the plaintiffs assert, constitutes a violation of rights 
owed to them pursuant to the Constitution of the United States.22 
Specifically, the plaintiffs claim the defendants violated their 
substantive due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth 
Amendment, rights protected by the penumbra of the Ninth 
Amendment, and rights under the public trust doctrine.23 
Unsurprisingly, the government moved to dismiss the case, arguing 
that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing for failure to plead a 
particularized injury; the plaintiffs could not sustain a claim under the 
Constitution because no right relating to GHG emissions exists; and 
the Court lacked jurisdiction over the public trust doctrine claims.24 
 
 19.  See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224, 1241 (D. Or. 2016) (observing that the 
majority of the plaintiffs are unable to vote because they are below the age of eighteen, forcing 
them to rely on others to protect their political interests). 
 20.  Once President Trump took office, he was replaced as the named defendant for the 
Office of the President until he was eventually dismissed from the case in 2018. Juliana v. United 
States, 339 F. Supp.3d 1062, 1080 (D. Or. 2018).  
 21.  First Am. Compl., ¶ 5 (emphasis added).  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See id. ¶¶ 277–310 (stating claims for relief based on each doctrine). The plaintiffs aver 
that the climate system is essential to their rights to life, liberty, and property, which are 
safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. These rights, they claim, have 
been, and are continuing to be, knowingly infringed upon by the government’s reliance on fossil 
fuels. Id. ¶¶ 84–85. Their equal protection claims are grounded in the argument that the effects 
of climate change will be inherently realized in the future; their generation and those that come 
after should be treated as a protected class to avoid any disproportionate discrimination. Id. ¶ 
297. The Ninth Amendment penumbra, it is alleged, provides further protection as it mandates 
that the enumeration of certain rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
by the People.” Id. ¶ 303; U.S. Const. amend. IX. Finally, the plaintiffs claim the natural resources 
that are of public concern to citizens—such as the atmosphere, bodies of water, and biosphere—
are the nation’s life-sustaining systems and they must be held in trust for the benefit of present 
and future citizens, something the government is failing to do. First Am. Compl., supra note 21, 
¶ 308.  
 24.  See Federal Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of Their 
Motion to Dismiss, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Nov. 27, 2015), ECF 
No. 27-1 (arguing that plaintiffs alleged a generalized grievance and not a particular harm, that 
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The decision to determine the fate of the lawsuit was first vested 
in Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin. In the early spring of 2016, Judge 
Coffin denied the government’s motion to dismiss.25 Short-lived, 
though, was the plaintiffs’ initial victory; the case was sent to the district 
court to determine if Judge Coffin’s decision would be adopted.26 After 
a hearing, District Court Judge Ann Aiken issued a first of its kind 
opinion.27 In her groundbreaking opinion denying the government’s 
motion, Judge Aiken not only echoed the reasoning of Judge Coffin 
but also  clarified and articulated holes in the government’s 
arguments.28 Judge Aiken began by discussing whether the plaintiffs’ 
claims raised a political question.29 In summarizing her analysis of the 
case under factors laid out in Baker v. Carr,30 Judge Aiken noted that 
a violation of constitutional rights is at the very epicenter of the 
allegations making the judiciary the proper forum for relief.31 
Next, she addressed the question of standing. The government 
argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife32 because: their injury was not particularized; the 
 
there is no substantive due process right to be free of greenhouse gases and climate change, and 
that the Public Trust Doctrine claims belong in state court). 
 25.  Order and Findings & Recommendations, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-
TC (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2016), ECF No. 68.  
 26.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2018) (saying that district court judges “may accept, reject, or 
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge”).  
 27.  See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224, 1262 (D. Or. 2016) (stating that the 
defense’s argument that “recognizing a federal public trust and a fundamental right to climate 
system capable [sic] of sustaining human life would be unprecedented,” but rejecting the 
argument as justification for dismissal). 
 28.  Id. at 1235.  
 29.  Id. at 1235–42. 
 30.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Baker involved a claim by certain voters of counties 
in Tennessee in which they sought a declaration that a state apportionment statute was 
unconstitutional, depriving them of equal protection of the law. Id. at 187–88. The Supreme Court 
in holding that the plaintiffs presented a justiciable question espoused six factors, each capable of 
establishing a political question, to determine whether a plaintiff had, in fact, raised a non-
justiciable political question. Id. at 217. Judge Aiken addressed each factor under Baker, finding: 
no constitutional provision puts the issue of climate change within the purview of other branches; 
the dispute at bar is neither beyond the competence of the court nor in want of a standard by 
which to be adjudicated; the redress plaintiffs seek would not offend another branch’s current 
actions or ability to act in the area of climate change; and it was undisputed that the final Baker 
factors did not apply. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1237–41. 
 31.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1241. Judge Aiken, aware that if plaintiffs were to prevail on 
the merits her holding would require a carefully crafted remedy to avoid infringing upon the 
separation-of-powers, explained that federal courts are given wide latitude “to fashion practical 
remedies when confronted with complex and intractable constitutional violations.” Id. at 1242. 
 32.  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Lujan requires that three elements be 
met for plaintiffs to have standing. The first element, injury in fact, is met where there is an 
invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized as well as actual or 
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government’s conduct was far too attenuated to be causally linked to 
the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries; and the relief the plaintiffs sought was 
too broad in scope to be implemented.33 Judge Aiken remained 
unpersuaded. Citing Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, 
Judge Aiken explained that, although the injuries may have the same 
root and may be shared by every American, the specific concrete 
injuries plaintiffs allege were not generalized grievances.34 Despite the 
concrete and particularized nature of plaintiffs’ injuries, Lujan still 
required the judge to determine whether the injuries were either actual 
or imminent.35 After referencing several portions of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint, Judge Aiken found the injuries to be sufficiently imminent 
and actual.36 
The Court also found the government’s reliance on Washington 
Environmental Council v. Bellon37 to support its causation argument to 
be misplaced because Bellon was easily distinguishable from Juliana. 
In Bellon, only five oil refineries were allegedly responsible for 
producing a mere six percent of Washington’s total GHG emission 
which could not have reasonably been linked to the plaintiffs’ injuries.38 
The plaintiffs in Juliana, however, allege that the United States 
government, over a 263-year period, was responsible for more than 25 
percent of global emissions.39 The Bellon holding, therefore, was not 
controlling in deciding the case at bar; the Juliana plaintiffs, at the 
 
imminent. Id. at 560. Second, a causal connection must be established between the conduct and 
the injury, meaning that the injury is traceable to the action of the defendant not some other third 
party. Id. Lastly, a favorable decision must likely redress the plaintiffs’ injuries. Id.  
 33.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1242–48. 
 34.  Id. at 1243 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“[I]t does not matter 
how many persons have been injured by the challenged action” so long as “the party bringing suit 
shows that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.”)); see Fed. Election Comm’n 
v. Akins, 524 US. 11, 24 (1998) (“[A]n injury . . . widely shared . . . does not, by itself, 
automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such an interest, where sufficiently 
concrete, may count as an injury in fact.”). 
 35.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1243 (“In an environmental case, a plaintiff cannot 
demonstrate injury in fact merely by alleging injury to the environment; there must be an 
allegation that the challenged conduct is harming (or imminently will harm) the plaintiff.”). 
 36.  Id. at 1244. 
 37.  Wash. Env’t Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 38.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1245 (“[C]ausation was lacking because the defendant oil 
refineries were such minor contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, and the independent third-
party causes of climate change were so numerous, that the contribution of the defendant oil 
refineries was ‘scientifically undiscernible.’” (quoting Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1144)).  
 39.  Id. at 1243 (emphasis added). Additionally, Bellon was decided at a different procedural 
posture—the summary judgment phase of the case. This is important to note because the Bellon 
Court issued its decision based upon all the findings elucidated during discovery not simply the 
pleadings. Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1144–47.  
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motion to dismiss stage, had sufficiently drawn the connection between 
their injuries and the governmental action.40 
Turning to redressability, the plaintiffs only had to show a 
substantial likelihood that a decision rendered in their favor would 
retard or eliminate the harm.41 Judge Aiken determined that plaintiffs’ 
request for relief sufficiently met the standard. The United States is 
one of the largest producers of GHGs in the world, and any reduction 
in the emission of GHGs would work to slow the devastating effects of 
climate change thereby redressing the plaintiffs’ injuries.42 Moreover, 
given the complex and intricate explanations required to answer the 
questions necessary to understand the scope of the plaintiffs’ injuries, 
the defendants’ causation, and the proper remedy, Judge Aiken noted 
expert testimony was necessary.43 Dismissing the case at the current 
juncture, therefore, would be an improper exercise of judicial 
discretion.44 
In perhaps the most famous and controversial portion of the 
opinion, Judge Aiken recognized the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment protects “a right to a climate capable of sustaining human 
life” as it “is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”45 Recognizing 
the fundamental right afforded plaintiffs’ claims of constitutional 
violations the highest standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny.46 To 
establish the existence of the right, Judge Aiken first set out the test as 
iterated by the court in McDonald v. City of Chicago.47 Under 
 
 40.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1243. 
 41.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (saying that plaintiffs must show 
that a remedy will “slow or reduce” their particular harm). 
 42.  Hammersley, supra note 16, at 13.  
 43.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1247–49 (noting how “scientifically complex” the 
redressability and causation issues at hand are, saying that none of the complex questions can be 
addressed at the motion to dismiss stage). 
 44.  See id.  
 45.  Id. at 1250 (“Exercising my ‘reasoned judgment,’ I have no doubt that the right to a 
climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”).   
 46.  See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (describing how strict scrutiny under 
due process “forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no 
matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest”).  
 47.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1249. The plaintiffs in McDonald alleged a fundamental right 
to possess firearms when arguing that a Chicago law restricting the possession of firearms to those 
with the proper certification infringed on their rights under the Second Amendment. McDonald 
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Judge Aiken, after listing the prongs of the test, then cited 
to Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), to explain judges must be wary of expanding 
the list of fundamental rights. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1249. Importantly, Glucksberg, a case 
alleging a violation of a fundamental right under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
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McDonald, a fundamental right will be sustained should it be shown 
that the right for which protection is sought is either “deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition” or “fundamental to our scheme of 
ordered liberty[.]”48 Judge Aiken, having exploited McDonald’s 
disjunctive by resting the right in its latter prong, effectively 
circumventing the rigidity of the Glucksberg49 test, took to a more 
recent Supreme Court precedent.50 
Obergefell v. Hodges instead provided Judge Aiken with the 
framework to uphold her finding of the plaintiffs’ claimed fundamental 
right. 51 Justice Kennedy’s “reasoned judgment” analysis allowed Judge 
Aiken to be guided rather than bound by history.52 Judge Aiken drew 
comparisons with other landmark cases, such as Roe v. Wade, to show 
that Supreme Court Substantive Due Process jurisprudence is wrought 
with instances of the Court finding unenumerated rights in more than 
one Constitutional source where such right is vital to the exercise of 
other protected rights.53 
Juliana’s one-of-a-kind holding did not aver that the right as 
defined therein meant just any claim where it could be argued that 
harm was inflicted unto the environment was an infringement of the 
fundamental right.54 Instead, Judge Aiken attempted to define the 
scope of the right she articulated by narrowing its application to only 
cases where “a complaint alleges governmental action is affirmatively 
and substantially damaging the climate system in a way that will cause 
human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage 
 
Amendment, clearly set out a two-pronged test for finding a fundamental right. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. at 720–21. 
 48.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (internal citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted). 
 49.  For a discussion on Glucksberg, see infra Part Two Subdivision B. 
 50.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1249 (relying on Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 
(2015)). 
 51.  For a discussion on Obergefell, see infra Part Two Subdivision C.  
 52.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1249–50 (citing Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664 (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 53.  See id. (describing how the fundamental right to privacy in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), was nested in the Due Process Clause, but also had roots in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Ninth amendments, while the right to marry in Obergefell was seen as a right supporting many 
other fundamental liberties). 
 54.  See id. at 1250 (describing how Aiken sought to “strike a balance and to provide some 
protection against the constitutionalization of all environmental claims” by “framing the 
fundamental right at issue as the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life”). 
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to property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the 
planet’s ecosystem[.]”55 
Successfully arguing the existence of a fundamental right, 
however, only provides protection from government action infringing 
upon that right. Generally, fundamental rights do not impose a duty to 
affirmatively remedy injury caused by a party’s actions.56 Judge Aiken, 
however, noted two exceptions to this rule, one of which she found 
relevant: the “danger creation” exception.57 The plaintiffs alleged the 
defendants were fully aware of the consequences associated with 
continued reliance on the consumption of fossil fuels as a main source 
of energy.58 They further alleged the Due Process Clause imposed a 
special duty on defendants to use their statutory and regulatory 
authority to reduce greenhouse gas emissions because of their 
knowledge.59 Accepting the factual allegations as set forth in the 
complaint to be true—a requirement at the motion to dismiss stage, 
Judge Aiken sustained plaintiffs’ due process claims, finding the 
plaintiffs met their burden in pleading that the government created 
danger.60 
Finally, the court addressed whether the plaintiffs’ claims 
sounding in the public trust doctrine may proceed.61 The government 
 
 55.  See id. (“To hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution affords no protection 
against a government’s knowing decision to poison the air its citizens breathe or the water its 
citizens drink.”). 
 56.  See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (saying 
that “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the 
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors”). 
 57.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1251. Under the “danger creation” exception, a plaintiff must 
show the government created the danger he or she would not have otherwise faced, placing them 
in a worse position; the plaintiff must then show the government knew the risks plaintiff would 
face but still acted intending to subject plaintiff to such risks, and did so with deliberate 
indifference or culpability which exceeds that associated with gross negligence. Id. The other 
exception to the general rule that there is no right to government aid is the “special relationship” 
exception, which maintains that an individual’s safety becomes the government’s responsibility 
when taken into government custody against their will. Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 
1247 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 58.  First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 278–79. 
 59.  Id. at ¶ 278–280. 
 60. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1252. 
 61. Id. at 1253–61. The Public Trust Doctrine provides public lands, waters, and living 
resources in a State are held in trust by the State for the benefit of all of the people. It establishes 
the right of the public to fully enjoy public lands, waters, and living resources for a host of 
recognized public uses. The doctrine also sets limitations on the States, the public, and private 
owners, as well as establishing the responsibilities of the States when managing these public trust 
assets. John Arnold, Examining the Public Trust Doctrine’s Role in Conserving Natural Resources 
on Louisiana’s Public Lands, 29 TUL. ENV’T. L.J. 149, 195 (2017). 
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argued they must not because: the atmosphere is not a public trust 
asset; the federal government has no public trust obligations, as any 
common law claims have been displaced by federal statutes; and 
plaintiffs lack the ability to enforce the federal public trust doctrine, 
should it exist.62 Addressing the scope of “assets” held in trust for the 
public first, the court declined to determine whether it included the 
atmosphere as the plaintiffs only complained of a violation of the 
public trust doctrine with respect to the ocean.63 
Next, in finding that PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana64 could not 
be read to relegate the doctrine’s application to only that which may 
be used against a state, the court found the doctrine could, in fact, be 
applied to the federal government.65 Judge Aiken then explained that 
common law had not been displaced by federal legislation as the 
defendants further contended, again distinguishing the government’s 
supporting case law from the case at bar.66 
Lastly, Judge Aiken began her analysis of whether the plaintiffs 
had the ability to enforce the public trust doctrine by identifying its 
constitutional origin.67 Agreeing with Judge Coffin’s findings that the 
Public Trust claims are properly delineated as substantive due process 
claims, she referred to her prior discussion that “the Due Process 
Clause’s substantive component safeguards fundamental rights that 
are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ or ‘deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition.’”68 The plaintiffs’ claims satisfied both 
tests.69 Therefore, all of the plaintiffs’ claims were allowed to proceed 
 
 62.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1255.  
 63.  See id. (emphasizing that because plaintiffs “have alleged violations of the public trust 
doctrine in relation with the territorial sea,” it was not yet necessary to determine if the doctrine 
extended to the atmosphere). 
 64.  PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012). 
 65.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1256 (saying that PPL Montana “cannot fairly be read to 
foreclose application of the public trust doctrine to assets owned by the federal government” and 
could not support the government’s position). 
 66.  Id. at 1257–60. 
 67.  See id. at 1260–61 (arguing that “the public trust predates the Constitution” in defining 
“inherent aspects of sovereignty” that existed under Social Contract theory). 
 68.  Id. at 1261 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)). 
 69.  See id. (specifying that the public trust claim satisfied both tests). Judge Aiken also noted 
that “[b]ecause the public trust is not enumerated in the Constitution, substantive due process 
protection also derives from the Ninth Amendment.” Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend. IX (“The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”)). 
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to the discovery phase, and the government’s motion to dismiss was 
denied.70 
The government, however, remained undeterred and sought relief 
through an application for interlocutory appeal in March of 2017.71 A 
few months later in June, the government’s order was denied.72 The 
very next day, the government sought mandamus relief in the Ninth 
Circuit, requesting a stay of district court proceedings.73 The Ninth 
Circuit ordered a stay and further ordered the plaintiffs to submit 
opposition papers.74 After hearing oral arguments in December, the 
Ninth Circuit denied the government’s petition as premature.75 Trial 
was again set, but the government attempted to avoid it by filing 
several more motions, and in July of 2018, Judge Aiken, again, sat for 
oral arguments.76 Without waiting for her opinion, the government 
filed another writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit to no avail.77 
Days later, the Supreme Court weighed in on the litigation, 
responding to the government’s petition.78 The Court dismissed the 
request without prejudice, finding it premature.79 The Court did take 
the opportunity to call the “breadth of plaintiffs’ claims striking” and 
note that the “justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds 
for difference of opinion.”80 The Court also encouraged the District 
Court to take the aforementioned concerns into account when 
assessing “the burdens of discovery and trial, as well as the desirability 
for a prompt ruling on the government’s pending dispositive 
motions.”81 
 
 70.  See id. at 1261–62 (asserting that because the plaintiffs’ claims are based in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, they may assert their claims in federal court, and denying 
defendants’ and intervenors’ motions to dismiss). 
 71.  Order Adopting Judge Coffin’s Findings, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517 (D. 
Or. June 8, 2017). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Juliana v. United States, No. 17-71692 (9th Cir. June 9, 
2017). Trial had previously been set for February 5, 2018. OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, 
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-us. 
 74.  Order Staying Proceedings, Juliana v. United States, No. 17-71692 (9th Cir. July 25, 
2017). 
 75.  See In re United States, 884 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]heir current request for 
mandamus relief is entirely premature.”).  
 76.  Oral Argument, Julianna v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. July 18, 2018). 
 77.  In re United States, 895 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 78.  United States v. United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., 139 S. Ct. 1 (Mem.) (2018) 
(denying the Government’s application for stay). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. 
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The government unabashedly filed another motion to stay 
discovery and trial, which was set for October 29, 2018, as well as 
another writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court.82 The Supreme Court again denied the government’s petition.83 
On November 8, after a panel of the Ninth Circuit granted the 
government a stay of trial, pending consideration of the defendant’s 
most recent writ of mandamus, the government moved for yet another 
stay.84 Judge Aiken then certified the case for interlocutory appeal, and 
the Ninth Circuit granted the defendant’s petition for interlocutory 
appeal thereafter.85 Oral Arguments were then scheduled and heard.86 
In a two to one split decision with a blistering dissent, the 
judgment of the district court was reversed on January 17, 2020.87 The 
Ninth Circuit, however, did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ 
arguments. Instead, the three-judge panel decided the case on the 
threshold question of standing, requiring the court to assume the 
validity of the plaintiffs’ substantive claims.88 The majority embraced 
with open arms the evidence showing that “climate change is occurring 
at an increasingly rapid pace” due to the consumption of fossil fuels.89 
The factual findings notwithstanding, and despite the majority’s 
finding that the plaintiffs’ injuries were particularized and caused by 
the government’s conduct, the court held that an order requiring the 
federal government to phase out fossil fuels was outside the scope of 
the court’s power.90 Exploiting the impassioned arguments of the 
dissenting opinion, on March 2, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a petition for 
 
 82.  In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452 (Mem.) (2018).  
 83.  Id. at 453 (“At this time, however, the Government’s petition for a writ of mandamus 
does not have a ‘fair prospect’ of success in this Court because adequate relief may be available 
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.”). 
 84.  Order to Stay Proceedings, Juliana v. United States, No. 18-73014 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2018).  
 85.  Jenna Lewis, In Atmosphere We Trust: Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the 
Environmental Advocate’s Toolkit, 30 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENV’T. L. REV. 361, 372 
(Summer 2019). 
 86.  See Hearing Reveals Little about Ninth Circuit’s Upcoming Climate Decision, 395 CORP. 
COUNSEL’S MONITOR, NL 18, Westlaw (July 2019). During oral arguments, when plaintiffs’ 
counsel was asked if the judiciary has ever ordered government action on this scale before, she 
pointed to several segregation cases; defendants’ counsel responded that those cases were brought 
in a piecemeal fashion, not “one gigantic case,” but one Judge was critical of the assertion that a 
step-by-step approach was reasonable given the global nature of the issue. See id.  
 87.  Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 88.  Id. at 1170. 
 89.  Id. at 1166.  
 90.  Id. at 1173. 
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rehearing en banc.91 As of the date of this writing, the Ninth Circuit has 
not issued a decision on the plaintiffs’ petition. 
Weathered and drawn out, Juliana’s controversial holdings have 
commanded national attention and spawned no shortage of 
scholarship.92 Until Juliana’s recognition of a fundamental right, not a 
single federal court had held in favor of a plaintiff asserting such a right 
relating to the environment. In fact, when given the opportunity to 
break ground in the area, courts have repeatedly and explicitly 
declined to do so.93 
Many courts have been careful when faced with claims similar to 
those in Juliana to leave open the possibility that a fundamental right 
to the environment exists.94 For example, one court in particular, also 
out of the District of Oregon, was presented with an allegation similar 
to that in Juliana.95 The plaintiffs in Animal Defense Fund cited to 
Juliana in support of their claim to a fundamental right to wilderness.96 
The Court distinguished the right claimed from Juliana, first noting 
that under Glucksberg, expanding the breadth of the substantive due 
process protections requires at least a “careful description” of the right 
 
 91.  OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST (last visited Sept. 18, 2020), 
 https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-us. 
 92.  See, e.g., Daniel Brister, Juliana v. United States, PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. (2019) 
(reviewing the facts and speculating on the possible impacts of the case); Steve Croft, The Climate 
Change Lawsuit That Could Stop the U.S. Government from Supporting Fossil Fuels, 60 MINUTES 
(CBS Broadcast June 23, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/juliana-versus-united-states-
climate-change-lawsuit-60-minutes-2019-06-23/. 
 93.  See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1998) (no right to a healthy environment); 
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United States, 404 F. Supp.3d 1294 (D. Or. 2019) (No. 6:18-cv-01860-
MC) (no right to wilderness); Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp.3d 237 (E.D. Pa. 
2019) (no right to a life-sustaining climate system); S.F. Chapter of A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. 
EPA, 2008 WL 859985 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C 07-04936 CRB) (no right to be free of climate 
change); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (no right to a 
healthful environment nor to be free of allegedly toxic chemicals); Fed. Emps, for Non-Smokers’ 
Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978) (no right to a clean environment); Pinkney 
v. Ohio EPA, 375 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (no right to a healthful environment); Tanner v. 
Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (no right to a healthful environment). 
 94.  See Ely, 451 F.2d at 1139 (“While a growing number of commentators argue in support 
of a constitutional protection for the environment, this newly advanced constitutional doctrine 
has not yet been accorded judicial sanction. . . .”); Pinkney, 375 F. Supp. at 310 (“Therefore, in 
light of the prevailing test of a fundamental right, the Court is unable to rule that the right to a 
healthful environment is a fundamental right under the Constitution.”); Agent Orange, 475 F. 
Supp. at 934 (“Since there is not yet a constitutional right to a healthful environment, (internal 
citation omitted), there is not yet any constitutional right under the fifth, ninth or fourteenth 
amendments to be free of the toxic chemicals involved in this litigation.”).  
 95.  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (D. Or. 2019). 
 96.  Id. at 1302. 
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claimed.97 Juliana’s right to a stable climate system is actually narrower 
than the “right to wilderness” plaintiffs sought, the court explained. 
Moreover, the Juliana plaintiffs did not take issue with just any 
pollution, they only sought recompense for catastrophic levels of 
pollution.98 “Plaintiffs here allege nothing of the sort,” the court 
asserted.99 Perhaps, it is because other courts have consistently and 
expressly denied the existence of an environmental fundamental right 
that the District of Oregon’s careful dance in distinguishing Juliana 
seems to be more of an acceptance of the possibility that such a right 
does exist—so long as it is properly articulated.100 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE: A HISTORY OF 
TRADITION 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates that 
“[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law[.]”101 While the Supreme Court has, since its 
inception, recognized the Due Process Clause applies to procedural 
matters, it was not until a decade before the first study linking human 
GHG emissions to climate change was published that the Supreme 
Court first expanded its interpretation of the Clause to safeguard 
substantive rights as well.102 At the turn of the 20th century, the Court 
started to locate and articulate rights that, while not enumerated in the 
Constitution, were otherwise fundamental liberty interests, upon 
which neither state nor federal government could encroach.103 Like 
everything else, though, the newly discovered rights were not absolute 
and were bound only by the exercise of certain government power.104 
Its limits notwithstanding, Justice Harlan noted: 
 
 97.  Id. at 1301. 
 98.  See id. at 1302 (saying that the court in Juliana “noted that plaintiffs did not object to 
the government’s role in just any pollution or climate change, but rather catastrophic levels of 
pollution or climate change.”) 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See generally id.  
 101.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 102.  Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660–61 (1887).  
 103.  See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (finding a freedom to contract 
between private parties). 
 104.  Id. at 53. Initially, Lochner described the limitations as relating to exercise of 
government power as it pertained to “the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the 
public.” Id. However, the Supreme Court eventually formulated a new limit, the current 
prescription as found in the “strict scrutiny” standard of review. See generally Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292 (1993). 
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the guaranties of due process, though having their roots in Magna 
Carta’s ‘per legem terrae’105 and considered as procedural safeguards 
‘against executive usurpation and tyranny,’ have in this country 
‘become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation.’106 
Though, technically, the first rights expressly recognized as 
“fundamental” spawned an era infamous for its jurisprudence,107 
subsequent decades were marked by the discovery of true fundamental 
rights, which are still enforced today. Despite its substantive due 
process jurisprudence spanning more than a century, the Supreme 
Court has frequently and, as such, seemingly unsuccessfully, aimed at 
dictating a test capable of properly outlining the composition of a 
fundamental right. Finally, the Court settled on its articulation in 
Washington v. Glucksberg.108 Prior to Glucksberg, the Supreme Court 
read into the Constitution rights that were in some way established in 
American history and tradition, or so they argued.109 Since the analyses 
varied, it is necessary to discuss the reasoning employed in determining 
what constituted a fundamental right in prior cases before discussing 
Glucksberg’s test to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
Court’s guiding framework. 
I. Foundational Fundamental Rights 
The concept of fundamental rights has scarcely been widened. In 
fact, a single digit denotes the number of unenumerated rights 
safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments,110 though many have been pleaded since the modern 
liberty right was thought into existence in 1923. Due in part to the 
judiciary’s awareness that a decision to establish a new right bears a 
 
 105.  Per legem terrae is Latin for “by the law of the land.” Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417 
(1897).  
 106.  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)). 
 107.  Caleb Hall, A Right Most Dear: The Case for a Constitutional Environmental Right, 30 
TUL. ENV’T. L.J. 85, 94–95 (2016); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“We 
do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch 
economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”). 
 108.  See Adam Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 101 (2002) (arguing that tradition should have no bearing on what constitutes a 
fundamental right). 
 109.  Id. at 127–40 (suggesting that different rights beget different analyses).  
 110.  In Malinski v. N.Y., Justice Frankfurter, after discussing the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause, bluntly asserted, “[o]f course the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has the same meaning.” 342 U.S. 401, 415 (1942). He stated further that “[t]o 
suppose that ‘due process of law’ meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the 
Fourteenth is too frivolous to require elaborate rejection.” Id. 
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heavy burden, courts have repeatedly reminded their audience of their 
reluctance to do so.111 The root of their apprehension likely stems from 
the fact that infringement of a fundamental right invokes strict judicial 
scrutiny,112 effectively removing the controversy from the political 
process as well as the legislature’s purview.113  Strict scrutiny requires 
that the government show that it has a compelling interest for 
infringing upon a right and that the means are narrowly tailored to 
achieve that end.114 
Before applying the strictures of strict scrutiny to a fundamental 
right, however, the Court would need to determine whether a 
fundamental right was implicated in the first place.115 Only when the 
Court was satisfied that the alleged right is “so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental[]” was the 
Constitution’s shield wielded.116 As the Court changed and society 
progressed, substantive due process jurisprudence evinced several 
fundamental rights that were safe from government action: the right to 
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children;117 the right to 
procreate;118 the right to bodily integrity;119 the right to marital privacy 
 
 111.  See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general matter, 
the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because 
guideposts for responsible decision making in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.”); 
see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins to argue that the 
Court must be careful when expanding substantive due process because doing so largely places 
the matter “outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.”). 
 112.  Russell Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625, 
627 (1992). 
 113.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).  
 114.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).  
 115.  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1248 (2020). 
 116.  See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (outlining what composes a 
fundamental right when addressing a procedural due process issue).  
 117.  See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1932) (following Meyer’s and 
Pierce’s logic in holding that the Constitution forbids forcing all children and adults to live in 
certain narrowly defined family patterns). 
 118.  See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540–43 (1942) (deciding the 
case on Equal Protection grounds as the law at issue affected one class of criminals differently 
than it would affect another). 
 119.  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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and use of contraception;120 the right to marry;121 and the right to an 
abortion.122 
One of the first fundamental rights was awarded to families and 
teachers. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court asserted its understanding 
that “liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting 
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary.”123 At issue 
was a law that forbade teachers at both private and public schools alike 
from teaching any language other than English.124 Noting the natural, 
strong desire immigrants had to instill values from their country of 
origin in their children, and that the American people always valued 
education as a matter of the utmost importance, the Court invalidated 
the law, as “a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited 
means.”125 A person has certain fundamental rights that must be 
respected.126 
Years later in Skinner v. Oklahoma, such a right was at issue. A 
repeat felon challenged a law that allowed the state of Oklahoma to 
sterilize him so that he could not reproduce any offspring unwanted by 
society.127 In support of its reasoning, the Court, though ultimately 
deciding the case on equal protection grounds, averred that the sanctity 
of marriage and the right to procreate were—in an important use of 
words —labeled as “fundamental to the very existence and survival of 
the race.”128 An exercise of the sterilization power would, thus, 
 
 120.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972) (finding the existence of a fundamental right but deciding the case on Equal Protection 
grounds).  
 121.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 122.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). This list is not meant to be exhaustive of every 
fundamental right in existence. The Supreme Court has found fundamental rights in other areas 
of the Constitution that are outside the scope of this article. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742 (2010) (relating to the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment). 
 123.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923).  
 124.  Id. at 396. 
 125.  Id. at 402. Just two years later in Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, the Court reaffirmed Meyer’s 
holdings, striking down a law that interfered with the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing 
and education of their children. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (“The 
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any 
general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from 
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state. . . .”). 
 126.  Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 (“That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to 
improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has 
certain fundamental rights which must be respected.”). 
 127.  Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942). 
 128.  Id. at 541.  
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constitute a deprivation of a basic liberty; the right to procreate was a 
basic civil right.129 
In Rochin v. California,130 the Court expanded the description of a 
fundamental right to not only be “so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”131 but to also 
include something “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”132 While 
this description did not provide a conceivable scope, the words’ history, 
on one end, provided a historical context granting certain terms 
workable definitions.133 The Court noted, for example, some words are 
so understood that they are merely visual symbols whose meaning 
cannot be changed.134 On the other end, some words were not afforded 
the luxury of a fixed meaning, requiring courts to employ a “continuing 
process of application.”135 Judges may not substitute their personal 
appreciations for the strictures that bind them.136 “The vague contours 
of the Due Process Clause” are guided by considerations that are 
submerged in reason and in compelling legal traditions.137 Due process 
requires a disinterested assessment of all the facts, detached evaluation 
of conflicting claims, and a judgment that reconciles “the needs both of 
continuity and change in a progressive society.”138 
Moreover, representing a divergence from the traditional 
approach, Griswold and Eisenstadt v. Baird did not rely on whether the 
right to use contraception was rooted in American history.139 Instead, 
the Griswold Court discussed the ‘penumbras’ associated with the Bill 
of Rights and determined that rights related to privacy were found in 
 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).  
 131.  Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
 132.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Palko involved an appeal by a defendant 
after he was convicted of second-degree murder and subsequently ordered to have a retrial, which 
ended with him being convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. He argued the 
retrial was an infringement of his Fifth Amendment safeguard from ‘double jeopardy,’ and 
thereby a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. The Court disagreed. See 
id. at 325. 
 133.  Rochin, 342 U.S at 169–70. 
 134.  Id. at 170. 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 170–71.  
 138.  Id. at 172 (“In each case ‘due process of law’ requires an evaluation based on a 
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly 
stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic 
but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive 
society.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 139.  Wolf, supra note 108, at 119.  
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several amendments.140 Relying on the newfound privacy rights, the 
Court then added, just before ending, that privacy (not the use of 
contraception) predates the Bill of Rights, political parties, and our 
school system.141 Extending the application of Griswold, the Eisenstadt 
Court decided the case on Equal Protection grounds but noted, in 
dicta, that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”142 History was 
again mentioned, but no relation to the use of contraceptives was 
drawn.143 
Loving v. Virginia, brought the return of tradition to fundamental 
right jurisprudence.144 In few words, the Supreme Court reintroduced 
the notion that the freedom to marry has been a crucial personal right 
at the root of the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.145 An 
infringement on such a basic right on the basis of race was strictly 
prohibited by the Due Process Clause.146 The Court here, as it did in 
Griswold, did not supplant a narrower right into a broader ‘penumbra’ 
in order to establish its fundamentality.147 
An analysis of tradition in American legal history is found in Roe 
v. Wade.148 The Court initially noted that criminal abortion laws were 
a “recent vintage” and not stemmed from ancient or common law 
origins.149 In fact, early writings discussing abortion at common law 
show that the debate surrounding abortion had not been an advent of 
modern societies.150 Early 20th century English cases and statutes even 
evinced an appreciation for the mother’s life, showing a trend that 
moved toward lifting criminal sanctions for abortions arising out of 
medical necessity.151 American law showed something different; it 
 
 140.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding elements of privacy in the 
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments). 
 141.  Id. at 486. 
 142.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Compare id. with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 148.  See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (analyzing American legal history in 
reaching its conclusion). 
 149.  Id. at 134. 
 150.  Id.   
 151.  See id. at 137 (discussing a newly enacted abortion law at the time). 
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wasn’t until the mid-1800s that abortion restrictions became 
commonplace.152Societal perception of the right sought did not vest 
solely in legislative enactments, the Court implied, as it also considered 
the stance the American Medical Association and the American Public 
Health Association took.153 The historical evidence, thus, could only 
lead to one conclusion: the right to an abortion was deeply rooted in 
our nation’s history.154 
Just under two decades later, however, the Supreme Court in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey did not employ such an extensive legal 
history analysis in revisiting the right to an abortion.155 Rather, the 
Court turned back to a different type of tradition. Due process once 
again became a safeguard for rights that could not be determined by 
the mere reference to a standard; it was more fluid.156 Instead, 
substantive due process claims called for the bench to exercise 
“reasoned judgment.”157 Conscious of their duty to define liberty for 
all, the Court referenced Roe, Griswold, and Eisenstadt to support their 
position because those cases involved personal decisions about the 
meaning of procreation and the responsibility and respect for it.158 
While substantive due process cases prior to Glucksberg applied 
somewhat differing concepts when establishing a new right’s existence, 
the lack of a cohesive standard did not leave future courts completely 
in want of some framework upon which to base their legal 
conclusions.159 The prior decisions show that tradition, either legal 
 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  See generally id.  
 155.  See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992) (in reaching its decision the Court did not employ as extensive legal historical analysis 
when compared to earlier decisions like Roe). 
 156.  Id. at 847–51. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting) (“Due 
process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to 
any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has 
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the 
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying 
of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has 
not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. 
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history 
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. 
That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not 
long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula 
could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.”). 
 157.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.  
 158.  Id. at 853 (“These are intimate views with infinite variations, and their deep, personal 
character underlay our decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey.”). 
 159.  See discussion on Foundational Fundamental Rights, supra Part Two Subdivision A.  
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(seemingly American and English) or societal, is an important factor 
at the crux of forming a new right.160 The intimacy and personal nature 
of the right claimed are likewise essential to the analysis.161 Although 
the oft-quoted passage authored by Justice Harlan in Poe called for a 
fluid interpretation of the substantive due process rights,162 Glucksberg 
shaped a test that is still observed when determining certain 
fundamental rights today. 
 
II. Washington v. Glucksberg: A Fundamental Test 
After years of jurisprudence guided by nothing more than vague 
overtures and inconsistent analyses, the Supreme Court, in Washington 
v. Glucksberg, created a test for determining whether an alleged right 
was to be granted the status of “fundamental.”163 
The respondents in Glucksberg sought to establish a fundamental 
right to physician-assisted suicide. The respondents were four 
physicians practicing in Washington, all of whom would occasionally 
treat terminally ill patients.164 Washington, at the time, had 
criminalized “promoting a suicide attempt.”165 The respondents claim 
that but for Washington’s anti-assisted suicide statutes, they would 
have helped patients end their suffering.166 The plaintiffs’ asserted 
liberty interest sought protection for a “personal choice by a mentally 
competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide.”167 
The District Court found the laws unconstitutional; the Ninth Circuit 
originally reversed stating that never once in the 205-year history of the 
Nation has the right to kill one’s self been found.168 After an en banc 
 
 160.  See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942); 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1932); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 161.  See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Rochin, 342 U.S. 165; Skinner, 316 U.S. 535; 
Moore, 431 U.S. 494; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390. 
 162.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 163.  See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (creating a test for 
determining whether a fundamental right exists). 
 164.  Id. at 707.  
 165.  Id.  
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 708. 
 168.  Id. 
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rehearing, the decision was reversed, and the Supreme Court granted 
cert.169 
Central to the opinion was the Court’s demarcation of the proper 
test to use when breaking ground in the realm of fundamental rights. 
The newly formed test required the right to be “deeply rooted in the 
Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed” and carefully described.170 
Since the institution of substantive due process jurisprudence, the 
concept that a fundamental right should be firmly established in the 
Nation’s origins, in some form, was encompassed in the description of 
what constitutes such a right.171 The history and legal traditions as well 
as the Nation’s practices provide a framework that curtails the 
judiciary’s inclination to shape the Due Process Clause according to its 
own ideas.172 The Court made clear that its idea of substantive due 
process jurisprudence development has outlined the liberty harbored 
by the Due Process Clause through carefully refined concrete examples 
of rights found to be deeply rooted in American legal tradition.173 This 
method removes, or lessens, the subjective components inherently 
involved in judicial review.174 Further explaining its reasoning and 
seemingly addressing Rochin, the Court added that the inclusion of a 
threshold requirement, the implication of a fundamental right 
requiring a higher standard of scrutiny, avoids “the need for complex 
balancing of competing interests in every case.”175 
To determine whether the respondents’ claims implicated a 
fundamental right, the Court first looked to the states’ statutory 
history.176 The Court found suicide bans had a long-standing place in 
history; the statutes, inclusive of nearly every state, established a 
commitment to protect and preserve all human life.177 In support, the 
 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. at 721.  
 171.  See discussion on Foundational Fundamental Rights, supra Part Two Subdivision A.  
 172.  Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“The doctrine of judicial 
self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground 
in this field.”). 
 173.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Id. at 710. 
 177.  Id. at 711 (“Indeed, opposition to and condemnation of suicide–and, therefore, of 
assisting suicide–are consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural 
heritages.”) 
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Court referenced Anglo-American law dating back 700 years as well as 
English treatises from the 18th and 19th centuries that condemned 
suicide.178 By the time the Colonies were established, an overall shift in 
societal perception of suicide displaced harsh penalties that 
accompanied crimes relating thereto.179 This change notwithstanding, 
society had not come to accept suicide; rather, society still thought 
suicide to be a grievous wrong, illustrated by enacting assisted-suicide 
bans.180 Despite ample opportunity to reexamine the laws, the Court 
noted, states have continually reaffirmed their place in American 
law.181 
Under the Court’s reasoning, when determining whether a right is 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history, it is permissible, then, to assess: 
laws of the Nations that existed before the United States; laws and 
attitudes of other states; treatises discussing societal attitudes and 
perception of the right; and the nature of the change, if any, that is 
shown between time periods.182 
More recent and less discussed than its counterpart, the second 
prong of the Court’s test presents more of a challenge initially. What 
exactly is required to provide a “careful description” is difficult to 
articulate, as an explanation is rarely, if ever, provided.183 The Court in 
Glucksberg offers little more. It states each of the ways in which the 
physician-assisted suicide right has been described, including the Ninth 
Circuit’s description and the respondents’ descriptions.184 To provide 
further insight, Justice Rehnquist referred to Cruzan to show that it is 
often referred to as the “right to die” case when, in fact, the Court’s 
iteration was “more precise:” the “right to refuse lifesaving hydration 
 
 178.  Id. (citing Cruzan v. Dir. of Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294–95 (1990)). 
 179.  See id. at 712–13 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294 (holding that while many colonies 
started with harsh penalties for suicide, they later abolished those penalties)).  
 180.  Id. at 714–15.  
 181.  Id. at 716. 
 182.  See generally id. (holding that review of laws, attitudes, treatises, perceptions, and 
changes over time about a right can inform courts as to whether the right is deeply rooted in the 
history of a nation).  
 183.  See, e.g., id. at 721–24 (reviewing use of “careful description” analysis in substantive due 
process jurisprudence); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United States, 404 F. Supp.3d 1294, 1301 (D. 
Or. 2019) (holding that a plaintiff must use a careful description to start the process of establishing 
a right as fundamental); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302–04 (1993) (holding that substantive due 
process analysis must begin with a careful description of the right asserted); Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125–27 (1942) (holding that courts have been reluctant to expand 
fundamental rights under substantive due process doctrine). 
 184.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723 (referencing other descriptions of the right, such as “right 
to die,” “liberty to choose how to die,” “right to control of one’s final days,” “right to choose a 
humane, dignified death,” and “liberty to shape death”). 
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and nutrition.”185 He quickly moved to the issue at bar, providing that 
the question in the case is actually whether due process safeguards a 
“right to commit suicide with another’s assistance,” the self-proclaimed 
carefully described right.186 
The impression the Court leaves is that the description must not 
be overbroad, and, on the other end, it can’t be too narrow. It must 
describe exactly what the party is seeking.187 In other words, the right 
must be considered in its most specific form.188 Anything more, or less, 
would not meet the strict limits of the prong, relegating the claim to 
almost certain defeat, as a mere rational basis for infringing on the 
“right” would prevail. 
The almost insurmountable Glucksberg test reaffirmed the 
Court’s reluctance to expand the scope of constitutional protection for 
unenumerated rights. Further, forcing complainants to not only 
describe their right with near perfect particularity but to also show that 
its roots are profoundly embedded in history, outright confronting the 
notion 
that substantive due process protects an evolving scope of rights.189 
Glucksberg’s refusal to exact a standard that recognized the “change in 
a progressive society”190 left proponents of the canons expressed in 
Poe’s dissent unsatisfied.191 That is, until Justice Kennedy dug around 
Glucksberg’s wooden posts to carve out another avenue for finding 
fundamental rights.192 
 
 185.  Id. (quoting Cruzan v. Dir. of Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)). 
 186.  Id. at 724.  
 187.  See id. at 724 (holding that “the right to commit suicide with another’s assistance” is a 
“careful description”); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (reflecting court’s hesitancy to extend end-of-life 
interests beyond denial of food and hydration); Flores, 507 U.S. at 302 (holding that judicial 
restraint called for courts to exercise caution when describing liberty interests); Collins, 503 U.S. 
at 125 (holding that the Court has been hesitant to extend liberty interests). 
 188.  Dave Rodkey, Making Sense of Obergefell: A Suggested Uniform Substantive Due 
Process Standard, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 756 (2018).  
 189.  Timothy Lydon, If the Parole Board Blunders, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Set the 
Prisoner Free? Balancing the Liberty Interests of Erroneously Released Prisoners, 88 GEO. L.J. 
565, 578 (2000).  
 190.  C.f. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (recognizing the balance that courts 
must strike between continuity and change in progressive society).  
 191.  See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 756 (Souter, J., concurring) (supporting Harlan’s analysis); 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that due process requires 
a balancing between tradition and breaking tradition). 
 192.  See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (holding that the right to marry 
is a fundamental liberty). 
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III. Obergefell v. Hodges: A Break from Tradition 
Nearly two decades of adherence to the principles formulated in 
Glucksberg culminated in a controversy that could not be molded to fit 
the immovable boundaries set by the Court. Understanding the 
magnitude of its decision, the Court carefully crafted an opinion that 
threaded its reasoning through the strictures of Glucksberg, tailoring, 
not supplanting, a more fluid design to substantive due process 
jurisprudence.193 
This tailoring process was conducted via Obergefell. The case 
involved 14 similarly situated plaintiffs, all of whom were denied the 
ability to legally marry their partner because they were of the same 
sex.194 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, conceded that 
traditionally marriage had been the union between man and woman.195 
Over time, though, this union that was once viewed as a contract 
“based on political, religious, and financial concerns” transformed in 
several ways to keep up with changing perceptions.196 To illustrate, the 
Court took to several decisions, each evincing not just a growing 
tolerance but an overall acceptance of same-sex relationships.197 This 
change in societal perception and legal footing is at the very crux of 
Justice Kennedy’s argument.198 
More specifically, the Court held that the Due Process Clause 
protects not only those interests enumerated in the Bill of Rights but 
also “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and 
autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and 
 
 193.  Id. at 670–71. 
 194.  Id. at 651–55. 
 195.  Id. at 657. 
 196.  Id. at 660 (“Indeed, changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation 
where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often through 
perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the 
judicial process.”). 
 197.  See generally U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (invalidating the Defense of Marriage 
Act); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick and a Texas law 
that made same-sex intimacy a crime); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating an 
amendment to Colorado’s constitution that discriminated against people based on sexual 
orientation); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding the 
Massachusetts Constitution guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (finding a law classified on the basis of sex was subject to strict scrutiny).  
 198.  See Miriam Galston, Polarization at the Supreme Court? Substantive Due Process 
Through the Prism of Legal Theory, 11 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 255, 282–83 (2019) (analyzing the 
majority opinion and Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion against the legal theories of 
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller).   
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beliefs.”199 Deciphering its scope is an enduring responsibility that “has 
not been reduced to any formula.”200 With just one sentence stolen 
from Justice Harlan, Obergefell quickly strayed from Glucksberg, 
gifting an interpretation of the Due Process Clause that had long been 
sought.201 Instead of applying a test, the Clause requires courts to 
simply exercise reasoned judgment when establishing liberty 
interests.202 Seemingly addressing Glucksberg, the Court concedes that 
history and tradition may guide and discipline the assessment, 
however, they “do not set its outer boundaries.”203 Using history as a 
mere guide and nothing more, thus, prevents the past from ruling the 
present.204 
The Drafters did not claim to understand the breadth of the 
freedoms safeguarded by the Constitution; instead, they vested in 
future generations the privilege of enjoying liberty rights as its meaning 
is learned.205 Having laid the guiding tenets for its new analysis, the 
Court referenced each of the prior cases in which it held the right to 
marry was fundamental to emphasize that the “essential attributes of 
the right [to marry] based in history, tradition, and other constitutional 
liberties inherent in [the] intimate bond” drive whether the rationale 
used in the prior cases should apply to same-sex couples.206 
The Court found four principles that provide support for 
concluding the right to marry is fundamental. The first principle is 
couched in the idea that marriage is innate to the concept of individual 
autonomy.207 Similar to choices regarding contraception, familial 
relationships, procreation and childrearing, choices regarding marriage 
are some of the most intimate an individual can make.208 Second, 
 
 199.  See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 453 (1972) (upholding the right to marital privacy)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
484–86 (1965) (establishing the right to use contraceptives). 
 200.  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 663–64 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting)).  
 201.  Id. (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  
 202.  Id. at 664 (“That process is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to 
analysis of other constitutional provisions that set forth broad principles rather than specific 
requirements.”). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. (“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.”). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 665 (citation omitted). 
 207.  Id. (“This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated 
interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause.”) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
12 (1967)).  
 208.  Id. at 666 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003)).  
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marriage supports a “two-person union unlike any other in its 
importance to the committed individuals,” a truly intimate 
association.209 A third canon is that the right to marry protects children 
and families alike, drawing meaning from the tangential rights of 
procreation, education and childrearing.210 Precluding same-sex 
couples from marrying would, thus, have harmful and humiliating 
effects on their children, the Court averred.211 Lastly, marriage is a 
“keystone of our social order.”212 These tenets when applied to the 
issue of same-sex marriage demonstrate that the Due Process Clause 
shields it from any encroachment.213 
The Court then pointed out that a class of people is being 
prohibited from acting in a way that others were not. By connecting to 
the Equal Protection reasoning, the Court further secures the right to 
same-sex marriage.214 But, camouflaged in the Equal Protection 
reasoning is the Court’s careful maneuvering of the Glucksberg test.215 
In no more than three paragraphs the Court acknowledges that 
Glucksberg did, indeed, call for a careful description.216 However, 
under Supreme Court precedent, the test as used in Glucksberg was 
suitable for the right claimed therein, but applying it to a fundamental 
right relating to marriage and intimacy would be wholly inconsistent.217 
Loving, Turner, and Zablocki all addressed the “right to marry in its 
comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for 
excluding the relevant class from the right.”218 
 
 209.  Rodkey, supra note 188, at 762–63.  
 210.  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 668 (“By giving recognition and legal structure to their parents’ 
relationship, marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their own 
family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.’”) (quoting 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)).  
 211.  Id. at 646. 
 212.  Id. (holding that marriage is “the foundation of the family and of society, without which 
there would be neither civilization nor progress.”) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 
(1888)). 
 213.  See generally id. (holding that the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause 
ensure same-sex couples the right to marry). 
 214.  See Rodkey, supra note 188, at 764 (citing Kenji Yoshino, The Supreme Court 2014 
Term: Comment: A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147 (2015)) 
(reasoning that invocation of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses afforded 
plaintiffs a negative right to be free from government intervention and a positive right to enjoy 
the marital benefits that opposite-sex couples enjoy).  
 215.  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 671. 
 216.  Id.  
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. (citations omitted). 
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Though critics argue that the majority’s opinion effectively 
overruled Glucksberg,219 Justice Kennedy meticulously articulated a 
new course for finding certain fundamental rights, careful not to offend 
Glucksberg.220 Exceptionally intimate and personal rights relating to or 
stemming from the right to marry require courts to examine the alleged 
right through a more fluid, evolving lens, exercising reasoned judgment 
instead of the unyielding constraints of a test better suited to adjudge 
a right dissimilar to marriage.221 
NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
The fundamental right to a climate that can sustain life is not 
deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the United States. Under 
the current formulation in Glucksberg, as well as in cases that came 
before and after, a fundamental right must be shown to be deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and implicit to ordered liberty.222 While 
the Juliana court stated in a conclusory fashion that “the right to a 
climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a 
free and ordered society[,]” the court provided no binding authority.223 
Before citing to another nation’s precedent, Judge Aiken simply 
parsed a sentence from Maynard v. Hill to support her one-of-a-kind 
holding, drawing parallels between marriage as the foundation of the 
family and a stable climate as “quite literally the foundation ‘of society, 
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.’”224 A 
closer look, though, proves otherwise. 
I. Environmental Protection is Not Deeply Rooted in History 
This Nation’s traditions and legal history show that environmental 
preservation in the United States is, when compared to other 
fundamental rights, a relatively new concept.225 For instance, the first 
 
 219.  See id. at 702 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is revealing that the majority’s position 
requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of 
substantive due process.”). 
 220.  See id. at 671 (holding that the standard in Glucksberg is useful for some cases, but it 
was not for marriage). 
 221.   See generally id. (adopting a test for determining fundamental rights which respected 
Glucksberg but recognized its inability to apply to certain rights).  
 222.  See supra Part Two Subdivision B. 
 223.  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224, 1250 (2016).  
 224.  Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)). 
 225.  See supra Part Two Subdivision A. 
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federal environmental law was not enacted until 1899.226 Major federal 
environmental legislation did not begin to take force until the 1960s, 
around the beginning of the modern environmental movement.227 
Moreover, Yosemite, one of the first parks preserving land for public 
enjoyment, was not established until 1864 by President Abraham 
Lincoln when it was ceded to California.228 In fact, Yellowstone, the 
first national park, was created in 1872 when Ulysses S. Grant signed it 
into law.229 Further, in 1892, the Supreme Court issued one of the first 
opinions that pertained to the preservation of the environment in 
Illinois Central.230 In that decision, the Court decided that the Public 
Trust Doctrine applied to a portion of lakeshore in Illinois near 
Chicago, prohibiting its use to serve the railroad company and 
preserving the land in trust for the benefit of the People.231 However, 
Illinois Central applied to the state government to hold land in trust for 
its constituents, not to the federal government.232 
While the federal government has been slow to effectuate change 
regarding environmental policies, states have, to some extent, taken 
their own initiative. Indeed, six states have provided some element of 
environmental protection in their constitutions.233 Arguably evidence 
of shifting attitudes, the change in the six states’ constitutions took 
place over two decades only before coming to a dead stop—with 
environmental amendments remaining dormant since 1987.234 In 
Glucksberg, nearly every state outlawed physician-assisted suicide, and 
 
 226.  See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401–67 (2006) (prohibiting discarding 
of any refuse matter into navigable U.S. waters); see also Andrew Franz, Crimes Against Water: 
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 23 TUL. ENV’T L. J. 255, 255–57 (2010). 
 227.  42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1980) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 33 U.S.C. § 
1251 (1972) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1963) (Clean Air Act).  
 228.  Sarah Corapi, 150 Years Ago, Abraham Lincoln Signed the Yosemite Grant Act, PBS 
NEWS HOUR, (June 30, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/yosemite-turns-150.  
 229.  Birth of a National Park, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, 
 https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/historyculture/yellowstoneestablishment.htm (last visited Sept. 
25, 2020).  
 230.  See generally Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (holding that the state of 
Illinois has fee simple over the lakebed of Lake Michigan).  
 231.  Id. at 404. 
 232.  Sharon Megdal, The Forgotten Sector: Arizona Water Law and the Environment, 1 ARIZ. 
J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 243 (2011).  
 233.  See generally Audrey Wall, State Constitutions and Environmental Bills of Right, THE 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS (Sept. 1, 2015), https://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/state-
constitutions-and-environmental-bills-rights (discussing the environmental provisions in the State 
Constitutions of Illinois, Pennsylvania, Montana, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and Rhode Island). 
 234.  Id. at 18 (showing Illinois was the first to amend its constitution in 1970 and Rhode 
Island was the last in 1987). 
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when the opportunity arose to remove those laws, the legislatures 
reaffirmed their positions.235 Evidently, only when there is a general 
consensus will there be sufficient evidence to do more than tip the scale 
ever so slightly in favor of finding a fundamental right relating to the 
environment.236 
Though the notion of preserving lands dates back more than 140 
years, only in 1896 was society made aware of the possibility that GHG 
emissions could have a harmful effect on the climate.237 Given the 
unprecedented nature of the findings, the study did not receive the 
credit it was due until the 1930s when the effects of the Second 
Industrial Revolution were more aptly realized.238 For decades, still, 
Svante Arrhenius’ study evaded peer review and expansion. It was not 
until relatively recently that a general consensus as to the existence of 
climate change in the scientific community was obtained.239 
The mere fact that the threat from climate change has become 
widely recognized does not alone afford the environment protection 
implicitly safeguarded by the Constitution. The laws of this Nation 
have not proven that the environment, let alone the climate, is worthy 
of bearing the “fundamental” status. Perhaps, the failure to shield 
anything relating to the environment was an oversight justly imparted 
unto the Drafters. The refusal of subsequent generations to manifestly 
remedy their shortcomings has guaranteed that, under the current 
framework, the Due Process Clause is not the proper mechanism 
through which the Juliana plaintiffs may seek redress. 
II. Plaintiffs’ Claimed Right is Not Carefully Described 
Assuming the plaintiffs’ claims satisfy the first prong contrary to 
the above analysis, they would still have to prove their fundamental 
right has been carefully described. A careful description requires the 
right to be labeled with precision.  Plaintiffs allege that “fundamental 
to our scheme or ordered liberty . . . is the implied right to a stable 
climate system and an atmosphere and oceans that are free from 
dangerous levels of anthropogenic CO2.”240  Claiming a right to a stable 
 
 235.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 717 (1997) (reviewing failure of legalization 
of physician-assisted suicide in states). 
 236.  C.f. id. (implying that the recognition of a fundamental right only comes with widespread 
public consensus). 
 237.  See generally Arrhenius, supra note 14 (discussing the harmful impacts of carbonic acid 
on the atmosphere).  
 238.  Harding, supra note 12.  
 239.  Id.  
 240.  First Am. Compl., supra note 17, ¶ 304. 
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climate is overbroad and, if established, would cause a flurry of 
litigation. The climate is an inherently unpredictable system, 
determining the baseline of a stable climate would be nearly 
impossible, especially as GHGs continued to be emitted.241 
Each of the established fundamental rights has an identifiable 
scope,242 making a violation of it more easily ascertainable. The same 
cannot be said for a right relating to the environment. For example, an 
injury from a violation of the fundamental right to direct the 
upbringing of one’s children will stem from a clear source and affect a 
family. Infringing on a fundamental right will likely have multiple 
sources and affect multiple people. The environment is vast, but 
fundamental rights require specificity and a narrow scope. Delineating 
what constitutes a violation would cause the right to be so narrow it 
only applies in very select situations, effectively caging its purpose, or 
so broad that nothing would offend it, rendering the right nothing more 
than a shell. 
The district court, though, more aptly described the right as one to 
a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.”243 However, this 
too does not meet the stringent standard required by Glucksberg. 
Currently, nothing would offend this right, save a toxic pollution event 
so large that its effects would be felt immediately, in that instance there 
would be a clear source and a clear right infringed. Additionally, the 
injuries plaintiffs endured did not render their environment completely 
incapable of sustaining life and do not run afoul of the right created by 
Judge Aiken.244 The right the plaintiffs seek is very particular and grand 
in scale, so a careful description is unlikely to be articulated given the 
breadth of plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, under Glucksberg, the 
plaintiffs’ and the court’s claims must fail as the right to a climate 
capable of sustaining human life is neither deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history nor is it carefully described. 
III. Juliana’s Reliance on Obergefell is Misplaced 
Perhaps, the reason why Judge Aiken attempted to exploit the 
fluidity espoused in Obergefell is that Juliana’s fundamental right 
cannot pass Glucksberg’s muster. Juliana requires more 
 
 241.  Michael Hopkin, Climate Sensitivity ‘Inherently Unpredictable,’ NATURE (Oct. 25, 2007), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/news.2007.198.  
 242.  See cases cited infra note 187 (reviewing “careful description” doctrine). 
 243.  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016). 
 244.  See First Am. Compl., supra note 17 (discussing mostly psychological trauma as the past 
harm).  
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maneuverability, an analysis that is more malleable to stand a chance. 
The right established in Juliana was completely non-existent, requiring 
the court to employ its “reasoned judgment.”245 Thereby, the Court 
relied heavily on the tenets of Obergefell,246 but for several reasons, that 
reliance was fatally misguided. 
Obergefell was revolutionary in its own right, not only for its 
holding but also for finally adopting the often-cited reasoning 
disseminated by Justice Harlan in Poe.247 The evolving standard of a 
fundamental right allowed plaintiffs, such as those in Juliana, to argue 
that establishing a fundamental right was now justifiable, it could be 
couched in an idea that was no longer controlled by history. However, 
the Obergefell court was cautious in deviating from Supreme Court 
precedent: the fluid analysis penned by Justice Kennedy applied to 
liberty interests involving “marriage and intimacy.”248 A right capable 
of sustaining human life cannot be said to be encompassed in any 
marital right, even if the environment may “underly[] and support[] 
other vital liberties.”249 Finding a connection there would serve to 
further muddy the already murky water that is substantive due process 
jurisprudence. 
Resting the right instead in the line of cases that sustain 
fundamental rights relating to intimacy provides more of a footing. But 
those rights, the right to an abortion and the right to contraception for 
example, are deeply personal and are experienced by no two persons 
the same.250 They are very intimate decisions that dictate what one does 
with one’s own body. The right thus protects a person, exercising self-
control, from any government intervening in or dictating how that 
person should exercise self-control. In contrast, protecting the 
environment from dangerous levels of GHG emissions does not 
protect an individual from employing their own faculties in making 
personal decisions. 
Judge Aiken attempted to circumvent these limitations in 
Obergefell by reiterating that courts may find new fundamental rights, 
 
 245.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1250. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542–43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing liberty 
as a continuum which includes freedom from purposeless restraint). 
 248.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671 (2015) (“Yet while that approach may have been 
appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with 
the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and 
intimacy.”). 
 249.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1250. 
 250.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (discussing the effects of pregnancy). 
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as the “generations that wrote the Bill of Rights” did not purport to 
know the entire scope of the liberties protected therein.251 Obergefell is 
distinguishable because it, as well as the cases on which it relies, 
address a discord between constitutional protections and “a received 
legal stricture.”252 Surely, the absence of a stricture cannot itself be a 
stricture. The plaintiffs in Juliana do not seek to strike down a law that 
prohibits them from exercising fundamental liberties. Instead, they ask 
for the court to direct the federal government to develop a plan that 
moves away from the use of fossil fuels as the main source of energy.253 
They ask for positive rights to government action in lieu of negative 
rights to be free from government action.254 
Importantly, Obergefell also notes in each line of cases involving 
the right to marry that the Court asked whether “there was sufficient 
justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.”255 In 
Juliana, the plaintiffs seek to establish a right for all.256 Obergefell 
merely addressed whether an expansion of the current right to marry 
was necessary to protect the liberty interests of same-sex couples.257 
The Court in Obergefell also noted that there were several decades of 
litigation, legislation, and scholarship that all culminated in its 
decision.258 Obergefell, in this way, is more closely aligned with Brown 
v. Board of Education,259 since the groundbreaking holding took place 
in a piecemeal fashion, not simply one fell swoop.260 Juliana attempts 
the unprecedented: to create a fundamental right to the environment, 
do it with one case, and restrict the government’s abilities. This goes 
against a key portion of Obergefell, which simply expanded an already 
determined and identifiable scope of an existing right. 
While a lack of history is not dispositive under Obergefell, Justice 
Kennedy still wrote at length about how both marriage and same-sex 
 
 251.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1249 (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664). 
 252.  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664. 
 253.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1233.  
 254.  Rodkey, supra note 188.  
 255.  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 671. 
 256.  See generally Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224 (seeking a right to a habitable climate).  
 257.  See generally Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644 (holding that the right to marry extends to couples 
of the same sex). 
 258.  Id. at 661 (citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 575 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
 259.  See generally Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown was one of the only 
other instances in which the federal courts have directed the federal government to take action 
on such a large scale. 
 260.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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relationships have changed in the eyes of the law and society.261 It 
cannot be denied that society’s views pertaining to climate change have 
also changed dramatically in the past decade alone, but in the eyes of 
the law it is still the 1970s. Obergefell made the last leap to align the 
jurisprudence of protected liberty interests up with society. Juliana 
seeks to bridge a gap that is far too wide to be done in one case. As 
with the right to marry, a fundamental right relating to the 
environment needs to be parsed out, the boundaries must be 
discovered before it can begin to be shaped. 
Perhaps, Juliana is the Bowers equivalent, but a fundamental right 
to a climate capable of sustaining human life is not a liberty interest 
protected by the Constitution under the current formulations 
governing Substantive Due Process analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Twenty-one plaintiffs, most of whom cannot vote for themselves 
to obtain a future they desire, sought redress by instituting what would 
come to be a groundbreaking lawsuit. From the outset, the plaintiffs’ 
ask was simple: constitutional protection for a right relating to the 
environment. Met by an adversary with seemingly unlimited legal 
resources, the plaintiffs managed to not only initially surmount the 
government’s arguments seeking dismissal of the case in its entirety but 
also secure the very protection they sought. For the first time, District 
Court Judge Ann Aiken held the Due Process Clause protected a 
fundamental right to an environment that can sustain human life. In 
doing so, the judge relied heavily on Justice Kennedy’s adoption of a 
fluid analysis for finding such a right as iterated in Obergefell. 
However, while Justice Kennedy’s formulation is more in line with 
nearly a century of Supreme Court precedent, his deviation from 
heavily relying on the history and traditions of the United States is not. 
As shown, decades of precedent unforgivingly live and die on the 
notion that only those things that are so rooted in the United States’ 
history and tradition can be said to be essentially implied in the 
Constitution. It was these cases that had already culminated in the 
Supreme Court’s attempt to delineate a test in Glucksberg. So long as 
those rights which were long-established in American history were 
carefully described, the Due Process Clause would afford them 
protection from government infringement. 
 
 261.  Obergefell, 574 U.S. at 660–63. 
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Understanding this rigidity, Judge Aiken utilized Justice 
Kennedy’s model. However, under both analyses, the Juliana right was 
found in error. First, under Glucksberg, environmental conservation is 
not deeply rooted in American legal traditions. While instances of 
environmental conservation arguably predate the first national park, 
meaningful steps are few and far between. When compared to other 
rights, environmental protection cannot be said to be essentially 
implied in the Constitution. Additionally, the court’s description was 
not careful enough. It would act to include environmental infringement 
not meant to be covered, and if construed narrowly to avoid 
overbreadth, it would become toothless. 
Second, considering the analysis in Obergefell shows that the right 
sought in Juliana does not fit its mold. Obergefell was a part of 
piecemeal litigation which expanded a right that already had 
boundaries and an identifiable scope. Juliana broke new ground. 
Moreover, Obergefell explicitly applied to the most intimate of rights, 
the kind that fall under the umbrella of a right to privacy. All of those 
rights involve personal decisions, not a decision that will affect others. 
As such, the right found in Juliana cannot be sustained under the 
current substantive Due Process jurisprudence, leaving the plaintiffs to 
search for an alternative method to stave off the impending climate 
change threat. Simply because the claims are not supported by 
fundamental right jurisprudence does not mean they cannot be sought 
in other areas of law or under different doctrines supported by the 
Constitution. The Founding Fathers put into place the proper 
mechanisms through which the People may remedy their injuries when 
one avenue fails to provide the necessary protection. 
Arguably the most radical and, perhaps improbable solution, 
would be to put the question of whether the Constitution protects the 
environment outside the scope of judicial review. Indeed, a 
constitutional amendment that shields the environment may be the 
answer to the otherwise avoided question.262 The frequent refusal to 
 
 262.  See generally Daniel Reeder, Federalism Does Well Enough Now: Why Federalism 
Provides Sufficient Protection for the Environment, and No Other Model is Needed, 18 PENN ST. 
ENV’T L. REV. 293 (2010) (discussing the feasibility of amending the Constitution); Carole 
Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the 
Present, 9 FORDHAM ENV’T L.J. 107 (1997) (examining proposed amendments to the constitution, 
previous environmental legislation as well as environmental legislation since the beginning of the 
modern environmentalist movement); Dan Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A Constitutional 
Amendment to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and Promote the Environment, 32 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 821 (2005) (exploring the environmental policy landscape before advocating for 
an amendment to the Constitution).  
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expand the unenumerated rights harbored by the Constitution to 
encompass a right pertaining to the environment is clearly indicative of 
the need for such an amendment. However, under the current political 
climate, it is unlikely that a significant alteration to the Constitution 
will be a successful path to securing environmental protection. 
Rather, putting pressure on the legislature to enact meaningful 
legislation may be a more plausible approach. Less drastic than 
amending the Constitution, and still subject to the same political 
atmosphere, lobbying for congressional action allows for climate 
change and harmful emissions to be combatted with precision not 
simply an overarching idea. Over time, the continued passing of 
environmental legislation will make even stronger the argument for a 
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, cutting the problem 
with both edges of the sword. 
However, time is of the essence. Quick action is required, and a 
piecemeal plan runs the risk of coming too little, too late. As such, it 
may be prudent to address the largest contributors to climate change 
with small but still significant impacts, fostering innovation and 
technological advancements that are not offensive to important 
industries. The controlling ideology in Congress, though, would need 
to change presumably through the political process. Since the 
beginning of the case, some plaintiffs in Juliana have become of voting 
age, and each day more like-minded youths join their coalition. It is 
this generation’s voice that Congress will heed. 
Until then, constant and unrelenting litigation seeking to expand 
the already existing environmental safeguards provides a sound 
approach. The boundaries of established doctrines, such as the public 
trust doctrine, must be tested in both state and federal courts.263 The 
approach taken by plaintiffs in Juliana should be mirrored and not 
discouraged by an unfavorable decision. Juliana had several pivotal 
holdings other than that which relates to a fundamental right. The 
plaintiffs also sought to expand the application of the public trust 
doctrine to the federal government, and as noted above, they were 
successful, a holding that garnered much scholarship. Several 
proponents have made compelling arguments in support of Juliana’s 
application of the public trust doctrine.264 
 
 263.  See Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice 
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 641 (2001) (advocating for environmental regulation primarily 
carried out by the States). 
 264.  See generally Michael Blumm & Mary Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, 
Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing the worldwide 
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In no way are these alternative mechanisms meant to be an 
exhaustive list of the remedies plaintiffs may plausibly pursue. A 
comprehensive approach is necessary to exact substantial and 
meaningful change, especially when faced with a Commander-in-Chief 
who is set on regressively revamping American industries hinged on 
the consumption and burning of fossil fuels. A continued, unified effort 




campaign of atmospheric trust litigation); Michael O’Loughlin, Understanding the Public Trust 
Doctrine Through Due Process, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1321 (2017) (analyzing the Public Trust Doctrine 
against public trust precedent). 
